"Safe Spaces: Mapping the Red Lines in Peacemakers’ Trade-offs"

Research Outline for B/Orders in Motion Seed Money Project 2018-2019

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1. People and institutions involved

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Principal Investigator Viadrina: Prof. Dr. Lars Kirchhoff, Director Institute for Conflict Management & Co-Director Center for Peace Mediation, European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder)

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2. Scientific subject of the project

2.1. Core scientific thesis and its relevance for research

Relevant disciplines of conflict studies such as political science, philosophy and law agree that the peacemakers’ primary obligation is to avoid doing harm. Yet there is lack of clarity – and sometimes open disagreement – how to measure such negative effects and how to avoid them. More clarity on this would be crucial as peacemakers often face difficult decision-making dilemmas where doing harm seems unavoidable: for instance, a ceasefire agreement might appear to be only possible by pushing the parties into it, leading to a weak truce with fewer casualties but a deeper erosion of trust (Ukraine-Russia 2015).

Our thesis is that for each dilemma a range of acceptable compromises can be mapped when the different assessments of the very actors involved in and affected by the effects of such decisions are compared in a given context. These "safe spaces" (“Zones of Perceived Acceptable Trade-Offs”) will become apparent when the "red lines" or "critical zones" beyond which trade-offs aren’t bearable for the affected actors are identified. Thus we research patterns of causality between decision-making trade-offs of peacemakers and their effects and acceptability for various affected actors. The relevance of the thesis for research is that its inter-subjective empirical approach allows for a better assessment and thereby avoidance of potential harm done in peacemaking. The relevance for practice lies in the decision support instrument for peacemaking we plan to develop on this basis.

2.2. Rationale for the research

The rationale for our research is to bridge the growing gap between a policy community worried by the complex challenges and risks of peacemaking for which they believe practitioners would need much better guidance and a practitioner community worried by normative frameworks that are often not sensitive to a given context and make it harder rather than easier to mediate (Hellmüller et al. 2015). It is precisely this gap that creates serious skepticism among practitioners about the added value of the normative development of mediation advanced by organizations such as the United Nations (see UN Guidance for Effective Mediation 2012, entailing on the one hand welcomed norms such as "consent" of parties to the process, but also pushing other norms such as “inclusivity” that may go against “consent”). As Jean Arnault – with an extensive track record mediating for the UN – points out: “(...) the international community should tread much more carefully (...) with the mushrooming normative framework to which it claims to subject peacemaking. However attractive it may be to fuse peacemaking requirements with all the other values the international community currently stands for, this temptation must be resisted, not embraced.” (Ramsbotham et al. 2014).
Aiming to build a bridge between a norm-based policy and a pragmatic practitioner approach our project wants to provide useful research-based support for practitioners through a combination of empirical evidence and normative reflection.

2.3. Peacemaking as umbrella term for different third party approaches

In a field as terminologically ambiguous as conflict studies, meaningful research depends on clarity of terms. We understand the terms peacemaker, third party or intermediary as synonyms for a person or team (acting in private capacity or representing states, international organizations or non-governmental organizations) that assists parties to prevent, manage or resolve a conflict. We distinguish different third party approaches under these umbrella terms, such as facilitative or low-powered mediation, directive or high-powered mediation and high-powered diplomacy.\(^1\) We deliberately do not focus exclusively on mediation as defined in the UN Guidance for Effective Mediation, because it ties the activity of peacemaking to a couple of normative preconditions, e.g. "consent" and "mutual acceptability". Irrespective of the fact that we do in principle support the normative elements of the UN definition, the reason for using a broader term such as "peacemaking" is to keep open the range of approaches to be studied as wide as possible instead of limiting it beforehand. With this framework terminology we can explore under which conditions and in view of which aims different peacemaking approaches have which effects.

2.4. Peacemaking dilemmas and trade-offs

Some situations appear as though they are unresolvable no matter what one does. Despite nothing but best intentions to fulfill the demands of a specific situation, one cannot but violate them because if one follows one of them, one neglects the other and there seems to be no third way (Raters 2013). While a dilemma is always about the inevitable failure to meet conflicting demands, peacemaking dilemmas are often about being forced to actually do harm in any case, because none of the available options is harmless, and even doing nothing may be harmful. Thus, these dilemmas in general emphasize the fact that peacemaking is not about the best approach, but about the best out of a series of worst options such as continued hostilities or spillover of conflict and external military intervention.

The spectrum of peacemaking dilemmas is broad. We focus on dilemmas that previous research both by the Swiss and the German project partners has shown to be key challenges of contemporary peacemaking practitioners. Amongst others these include:

- **Realizing peacemakers’ values and interests versus upholding impartiality and ownership of parties:** There is a potential tension between intermediaries’ interests and values (without which they will not get engaged and have no orientation) and the need to be impartial and to leave as much decision-making autonomy in the hands of the conflict parties as possible (without which any peace made will not be legitimate and sustainable) (Kraus 2011a). This tension turns into a dilemma when those choosing the peacemaker or the peacemakers themselves know they are partial but most likely the only ones with the possibility of “unlocking” the situation (Svensson et al. 2013).

- **Ending violence versus advancing sustainable peace:** Another crucial dilemma is generated when mediating bodies have to decide if they either push parties to a ceasefire agreement that stops violence in the short-term, even if it may not last long or may consolidate a protracted conflict, or rather work towards a more legitimate, sustainable solution in the long-term that is owned by the conflict parties but will cost the lives of more people, combatants as well as uninvolved citizens in the process of negotiating it (Beardsley 2011).

- **Ensuring "universal" human rights (e.g. gender equality) versus ensuring "culture"-sensitivity:** Another example where a decision making trade-off is necessary is the tension between promoting essential human rights, such as gender equality (aiming to lead to wider representation and more legitimate outcomes) now codified in the UN Resolution 1325, and the norm of being culturally-sensitive (also

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\(^1\) Facilitative or low-powered mediation: following the framework of classical mediation as found in interpersonal and business mediation (Moore 2003) e.g. by ensuring the parties’ consent to the process, not providing solutions; directive or high-powered mediation: following a normative framework of mediation but allowing for more pressure exercised on the parties and possibly suggesting options, yet still not directly influencing the content of the final agreement; high-powered diplomacy: following normative frameworks of politics, mainly using tools of power politics, e.g. not worrying about consent of the parties (Mediation Support Network 2013; Beardsley et al. 2006).

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aiming for more legitimate and sustainable outcomes, only on a different path) when the dominant group in a given culture is opposed to gender equality.

The intermediary’s role bears by its very nature an inherent tendency to encounter such dilemmas, as an intermediary acts on behalf of multiple principals and protégées with very different goals, needs and justified expectations: conflict actors, conflict-affected groups, stakeholders to the conflict (states, companies, etc.), mediators’ constituencies and donors, the international community, various and possibly colliding legal regimes, and professional communities. Plus, third parties cannot, even if striving to do so, neutralize their own personal and institutional goals and interests, worldview and values or those of their constituencies.

Trade-off decisions in these dilemmas constantly risk violating the limits of what the systemic orders of these various principals can endure (e.g. violence, insecurity, injustice, loss/lack of recognition, resources and self-determination, violation of cogent norms), as well as what the peacemakers’ own system is ready to bear (e.g. loss of support of constituencies, reputation or donor money, violation of moral convictions). The most intriguing point for research from an ethical perspective is that the distribution of these very different types of costs (and of course also benefits) in peacemaking trade-offs often follows intransparent, arbitrary factors with natural selection biases, such as the peacemakers’ personal weighing up of supposed costs, its institutional agenda or pressure from any actor who is capable of exerting it.

2.5. Strategies for dealing with peacemaking dilemmas

There is not much systematic research yet about the transferability of strategies used for specific types of peacemaking dilemmas. Some of the most discussed include the following:

A classical strategy in the face of a dilemma is trying to prioritize the norms or values underlying the competing demands in the given situation. A prioritization of mediation norms such as "consent" could also be sought on a general policy basis to provide for better orientation and prevent doing more harm than good (Hellmüller et al. 2015). Parties also lose trust in non-violent conflict resolution efforts when they expect decision-making autonomy in a mediation process, and this is not granted (Bercovitch 2002).

Another established strategy – “sequencing” – is to explore whether one demand can be met after the other. In peacemaking, sequencing is used particularly where the demands of peace/stability and justice/legitimacy are in conflict with each other. UN Special Representative of the Secretary General, Lakhdar Brahimi, has noted on this logic: “If you accept these kinds of jobs, you go and mediate between warlords, faction leaders, bandits, all sorts of people, people whom the human rights purists want to see hang. What I tell them is ‘Let me finish, and then go ahead and hang them.’” (Harriet 2006, 25-26). In the Kenya 2008 post-election mediation, Kofi Annan sequenced issues of immediate (ending violence, humanitarian situation) and longer-term concern (structural root causes) (Lindenmayer et al. 2009). One danger of sequencing is that the first step can affect and hinder (implicit) plans for the following steps. Non-state armed groups, for example, will often avoid a ceasefire agreement without the longer term power sharing arrangements already agreed, as they fear the government will stop negotiating seriously once the violence has been stopped (e.g. concern raised by the Syrian opposition). Thus ceasefire agreements can at times freeze a conflict, rather than lead to a process that deals with the underlying causes of the conflict (e.g. Korea 1953, Nagorno-Karabakh 1994, Ukraine 2015). Also other peacemaking dilemmas, such as whether or not to mediate without a clear mandate, can be sequenced: it is possible to start mediating with an unbalanced mandate or no mandate at all and reach it incrementally (Wallensteen et al. 2010).

Yet another strategy is to redistribute decision-making power. Thinking in the logic of classical mediation, where content-related decisions belong to the domain of the parties, while the mediator focuses on process-related decisions, one can argue that the peacemaker is not responsible for most of these decisions and should leave them to the parties. Parties will indeed best know which trade-off solutions are bearable and feasible for them (and in some cases, they may not even have the dilemma the peacemaker has). However, this strategy will always leaves something that needs to be considered very carefully: what about the process and content decisions that affect actors who are not represented at the table and thus cannot influence the decisions made there? How should costs and risks on their side be taken into account? Should these actors be given a (stronger) voice or not? Should a peacemaker insist on protective
rights for them or not? In a nutshell, this redistribution strategy tries to solve the dilemma between the paternalist-oriented (‘third party knows best/can do it alone’) and the autonomy-oriented (‘parties know best/can do it alone’) responsibilities of peacemaking by neglecting the first dimension. However, the two dimensions need to be balanced if all actors affected by the effects of a decision are to be considered.

3. Research aim, focuses and questions

Our research aim is to gain more empirical and theoretical clarity on: 1) the concrete effects of different types of peacemaking dilemma trade-offs on a conflict system, and 2) the actual capacities and limitations of relevant actor groups to endure and accept these effects. Narrowing down the resulting research agenda to a manageable size means focusing on:

Attributed and contingent causality patterns: We assume that the effects of peacemakers’ decisions and actions in a conflict system are attributed and contingent, because most peacemaking environments are social systems with intransparent cause-effect-mechanisms and a complicated, complex or even chaotic system status where contextual conditions create always new unknown impact factors ("known unknowns", "unknown unknowns" or "unknowables", Snowden et al. 2015; Mason 2016). This means, firstly, that in general there is no way to ascertain any causality beyond doubt; and secondly, that instead of linear deterministic “if A then B” patterns of causality there might only be “if there is A under these contextual conditions, then outcomes such as B, C and D are likely”.

Question: Are there common causality patterns between the trade-offs (and resulting actions) peacemakers make and their attributed effects on peace processes and conflict systems when we compare various cases in different contexts? If yes, what are they?

Diverging evaluation of attributed effects: The actor groups affected by these decisions can differ widely in their evaluation of these attributed effects, depending on their reference system of values, identities, grievances and interests, e.g. warring conflict parties may prefer or accept a prolongation of conflict in order to stay in control and increase their chances to get what they are fighting for whereas sections of a conflict affected civil society may prefer an immediate end of violence and stability at any political price.

Question: Where and how do these actor systems distinguish between bearable and unbearable negative effects that decide about the dys/functioning of their systemic order? This implies the search for a suitable criterion for harm done in conflict systems, where conflicts itself are about the dys/functioning of their systemic order.

4. Research concept and guiding hypothesis

Based on a range of case studies we intend to map the context-specific "Zones of Perceived Acceptable Trade-offs" (ZOPATs) of peacemakers, conflict parties, conflict-affected groups, and international community and compare them in view of context-independent joint patterns in their perceptions of acceptable and not acceptable trade-offs. The case studies will cover full peace processes or single negotiation periods (e.g. marked by agreement or change of mediator) of the recent past to be able to identify effects of decision-making ex-post and to diminish restraints of confidentiality. In a first step, each case will be analyzed from the different actor perspectives involved: dilemma(s) faced, trade-offs made, effects attributed, and evaluation of effects. In a second step, we will search for similar a) causality patterns and b) non/acceptance patterns between cases, perspectives and contexts. Even if we do not find commonly agreed limits for trade-offs (i.e. "red lines"), there may well be "critical zones" that can be marked with "threshold values", which when overstepped might produce unacceptable costs with high probability. Even if there are only few context-independent patterns, the comparative research will collect peacemakers’ dilemma strategies and analyze what is helpful and transferable to different contexts.

Our guiding hypothesis is that if the peacemakers’ ZOPAT is clarified and sufficiently overlapping with the other relevant actors’ ZOPAT, third party interventions are likely to lead to more effective and accountable peace processes.

Table 1 shows an exemplary, provisional attempt to put different peacemaking dilemmas into an interdependency model, aiming at a manageable degree of complexity. The two choices of a dilemma are located
at the outer or inner end of the radius. The bright red line symbolizes the threshold between the zone of perceived acceptable options (green) and the zones where trade-offs could do harm (red).

5. Theoretical Background

We build on a transdisciplinary approach to peace and conflict research that combines different scientific perspectives to grasp the complexity of the observed problems.

Political Science (Peace and Conflict Studies): Building on classical studies of mediation success and failure (Bercovitch 2006; Kleiboer 1996) there is now increasing attention to the negative effects of peacemaking (Autessere 2016; Kraus et al. 2014; Hellmüller et al. 2014; Destradi et al. 2012; Kuperman 1996) and moral hazard in peacemaking (Kuperman 2008). Besides analyses of general practical and ethical dilemmas in mediation (Waldman 2011; Bush 1994) we draw on a growing number of studies on peacemaking dilemmas/trade-offs, for instance related to different mediation styles aiming for different mediation outcomes (Beardsley et al. 2006), short-term and long-term goals such as in the peace/justice tension (Beardsley 2001), the effects of third party bias on peacemaking outcome (Svensson 2015; Kraus 2011a; Favretto 2009), the tensions related to the development of a normative mediation framework on mediation practice (Hellmüller at al. 2015), the tensions between local and international sources of peacemaking (ACCORD 2014), or the tensions between mediation and democracy (Nathan 2016).

Sociology (Systems Theory/Frame Analysis): For analyzing the complexity of causality patterns in peacemaking we draw on the Cynefin framework distinguishing simple, complicated, complex and chaotic systems (Snowden et al. 2015; Mason 2016) and models of interconnected thinking in complex decision-making (Vester 2007; Dörner 1989). For analyzing what constitutes and changes the perception of situations as dilemmas we build on framing and reframing theories that allow for decoding their frames of reference (Goffmann 1974).

Philosophy (Political Philosophy, Applied Ethics, Philosophy of Language): Our understanding of third parties’ ethical responsibilities (see Waldman 2011) is based on justice theories of Rawls (1975), Sen (2009) and Forst (2007). For an ethical analysis of peacemaking dilemmas we draw on moral dilemma studies (Raters 2013; Gowans 1987) and the ethics of conviction vs. responsibility debate (Weber 2004). The theory of dirty hands (on whether ends can justify means in politics or not, Coady 2014; Walzer 2004) helps to understand opposing arguments on the acceptability of trade-offs. For developing the decision support instrument we will consider a social constructivist approach to ethical decision-making (Cottone 2001), where acceptable practice is defined through a process of negotiation between different frames of refer-

Table 1: Exemplary model of mapping the peacemakers’ Zone of Perceived Acceptable Trade-Offs (ZOPAT)
ence. As philosophy of language is an inspiration for many peacemakers to create flexibility in meaning making, we draw on Bitter (2003) and Isaacs (2011) who apply concepts from Wittgenstein and Foucault to peacemaking.

**International Law/Human Rights:** From the international legal perspective, the tensions between and normative implications of colliding third party roles first spelled out by Chinkin (1994) prove relevant for our project. The legal complexities of non-international armed conflicts are illustrated in the work of Dinstein (2013), with modern peacemaking practice still having to adapt to this frequent type of conflict. Analyzing mediation dilemmas in scenarios of transnational justice will draw from studies such as Bell (2008) and Kirchhoff (2009). Finally, as constitutional peace agreements – seeking to transform conflict to peace by altering societal norms – shape the environment in which jus post bellum operates (Easterday 2014), any peacemaking dynamics and dilemmas must and will be reflected in close connection with the anatomy of these agreements.

**Psychology (Systemic Approaches/Educational Theories):** For deconstructing dilemmas we build on the pragmatic and creative problem-solving strategies of systemic and solution-oriented counseling, supervision and coaching (Watzlawick et al. 1974; de Shazer 1985), e.g. suggesting that solution and problem are independent from one another, the solution being something new instead of the negation of the problem. We draw on Bateson’s (1981) conceptualization of the double-bind problem and how to deal with it. To develop the project’s action-research design (see below) as well as the decision-making instrument we draw on models of reflective practice and experiential cyclical learning (Kolb et al. 1975; Schön 1983) and structured debriefing (Gibbs 1988).

6. **Methodological Approach**

In complicated, complex and chaotic systems such as peacemaking, appropriate solutions to problems evolve from within the system in a trial and error manner, as an "emergent practice" (Snowden et al. 2015). We respond to this need with an iterative methodical approach based on the following cycle of phases of generating and adapting knowledge inspired by systemic-constructivist learning theory (Kolb et al. 1975; Schön 1983):

1) Collecting empirical data, e.g. by interviews; 2) Reflecting on it, analyzing it and making meaning out of it from different theoretical points of view, e.g. in workshops; 3) Constructing needs, goals and strategies, e.g. in the research design; 4) Developing models for practice, e.g. an instrument for decision support; 5) and then testing it in practice, e.g. with a pilot release of the instrument. The iterative cycle will be started during the Seed Money Period and repeated in the longer-term funding period as long as it takes to make the model useful for practitioners. Thus it is actually a spiral, in which each new cycle shifts and refines the generated knowledge – and with it the research design.

This approach depends on peacemaking practitioners and policy-makers both as sources of information and know-how and as implementers of the (interim) results, and therefore necessarily involves a participatory action-research component (Chevalier 2013). This action-research component will bring together three groups: practitioners who have wrestled with dilemmas in their own conflict context, policy-makers who seek to establish norms on a regional or global level, and scholars who contribute different theoretical perspectives and new ways of reflecting and conceptualizing practice. The practitioner and the policymakers group will include representatives of international and regional organizations, NGOs and states; the scholars will cover relevant disciplines such as political science, philosophy and international law. They will be all partners in the whole research cycle, finally testing the instrument for decision support on real cases in action research-workshops and pilot release.

Table 2: Iterative Cycle of generating and adapting knowledge

![](image)
As to the empirical research we will follow a qualitative approach conducting semi-structured experts interviews, focus groups and structured debriefings to be analyzed with qualitative content analysis. The sampling will include peacemakers, conflict parties, conflict-affected groups, policy-makers and representatives of international community and donors, ideally covering all groups for each case study. Access to relevant interview/debriefing partners is ensured through the project member organization’s close relations to peacemaking actors, the well-connected Swiss mediation support system and the international Mediation Support Network both applicant organizations are members of.

7. Framework to support decision-making to be developed

We intend to develop a research-based, practice-oriented instrument for decision-making in peacemaking. Due to the manner in which it is to be developed, this instrument aims to be both innovative in form and content of guidance offered: it should improve autonomous decision-making informed by contextualized empirical evidence and normative orientation. The instrument will be co-designed and co-tested with practitioners (see 9.) to adequately respond to how peacemakers are making difficult decisions. Possible methods are: 1. Trade-off scenarios (“Leading from the future”, Fahey et al. 1997) projecting various possible alternative solution/outcome scenarios that allow mediators to realize the potential consequences of their decisions for affected actors. 2. Combined intuitive-systematic heuristics (“Fast and Slow Thinking”, Kahneman 2011) that allow peacemakers to activate experiential knowledge and test intuitive judgments on the basis of comparative knowledge. 3. Decision trees to map options and trade-offs that allow peacemakers to consider which path possibly leads to which results.

Instead of a normatively prescriptive or recommendatory approach (saying which choice is most likely the better one), we take a descriptive-instructive approach that creates full awareness of loss potential and related responsibilities and leads through a decision-making strategy, but leaves the full autonomy of content and decision-making to the peacemakers. The consequentialist thinking (choose and evaluate actions according to their assumed consequences) we use is well established in the field, plus it reduces the dilemma pressure resulting from overly idealistic deontological views (choose and evaluate actions according to duties/principles to be fulfilled).

In view of the instrument’s content, our main hypothesis (to be checked by the theory development and empirical interviews) is that the process-content distinction of classical mediation provides the basis to find ways to get to more universally acceptable process principles and ways of how to operationalize them in specific contexts, while leaving the less universal content in the hands of the parties.

8. Connection to the university’s key research area “B/Orders in Motion”

The added value of the B/Orders in Motion heuristics for our project lies in providing an analytical matrix for liminal phenomena (red lines, critical zones, thresholds, break lines). We are convinced that our project will in turn produce thought-provoking contributions to B/Orders in Motion theory building, with empirical data as well as with theoretical insights from different disciplines.

We can build on results of our previous B/Orders in Motion project that also dealt with the negative impacts of third parties in peace processes (“Managing boundaries in triadic negotiations processes”, 2014-2016, together with Prof. Neyer, Prof. Söllner, Dr. Wagner et al.): "Managing Boundaries" focused on the influence of third parties’ skills and normative frameworks on their impact on conflict systems and revealed that this influence might not be as high as we assumed. What needs to be better understood in the first place, so our starting point for the "Safe Spaces" project, is how decisions and actions of third parties are related to harmful effects.

We look forward to collaborate with other B/Orders in Motion Seed Money projects. With the following projects we found particularly stimulating overlaps. 1) Detection and Surveillance of Spatial and Spatio-temporal Clusters (Philip Otto, M.Sc. et al.): As discussed with Mr. Otto this project could translate our problem description and qualitative data into a formalized model. This could help us to develop a clear formula of the interrelations between relevant factors creating boundaries of acceptability and conceptu-
alize threshold values. Mr. Otto’s project could in turn use our data for its own research. Results could be fed into a B/Orders Research Factory. 2) B/Ordering Algorithms (Dr. Ben Wagner et al.): With this project we share a strong common interest in the decision-making processes of "auxiliary units" (they: algorithms, we: third parties) characterized by intransparent criteria and unclear accountability. We already worked together with Dr. Wagner in the "Managing Borders in Triadic Negotiation" project, and joint activities such as a participation in their academic workshop on black box decision-making at the University of Cambridge in October 2017 and a subsequent working paper (e.g. developing an accountability framework to support decision-making of auxiliary units) promise to be very inspiring. 3) Infrastrukturen der Grenze (Dr. Hannes Krämer et al.): Regular exchange with these colleagues will allow us to clarify and consolidate our B/Order heuristics, e.g. by focusing on how social and communicative acts demarcate boundaries of acceptability that might (or not) condense into collective norms. We would greatly appreciate actively participating in the scientific network planned by this project and in workshops on B/orders in Motion meta-issues such as the complexity and materiality of borders.

9. Contribution to enhancing the research profile of the European University Viadrina

An international research project dedicated so directly to improving the quality and transparency of modern conflict resolution and peacemaking can be seen as a natural and contemporary translation of the university’s founding mission into the challenges of present times. The project will strengthen Viadrina’s profile as a university that engages in political and societal thinking and action in a responsible, pro-active and innovative way. Its practice-oriented action-research approach – to make use of the established access to policy actors, ministries and practitioners, to generate and digest empirical data and to feed the implications of the research directly back into the policy system – illustrates Viadrina’s understanding of science as a means to change the thinking and acting of decision-makers.

In terms of substance, the project aims at merging two key fields of Viadrina’s research profile, namely border studies on the one and conflict studies on the other side. The focus of attention will be on red lines, critical zones and safe spaces – and the respective dynamics associated with detecting and possibly moving them. It is one of the aims of the project to closer define and further develop the evident synergies between border and conflict studies. Decision-making in border situations seems a most enriching and fruitful field to do so.

Finally, the cooperation with the two key partners – CSS/ETH Zurich and Kiev Mohyla Academy – will further strengthen Viadrina’s international academic network and reputation. The joint activities of the Institute for Conflict Management/Center for Peace Mediation with these two actors during the last years have already led to relevant new research networks (e.g. the global Mediation Support Network), access to unique empirical data (for example with regard to the Ukrainian crisis) and additional funding options. A stable, trustful long-term cooperation will be even more enriching for all actors involved.

10. Data management plan

A comprehensive data management plan will be developed with professional IT support at the beginning of the Seed Money period on this basis:

- Types of data: Raw data in form of audio tapes and transcriptions as well as collections of supporting materials acquired in participatory observations, interviews, debriefings, focus groups; derived data from analyses of empirical studies and meta-studies.
- Short-term management: Version control for files, regular backing-up of data.
- Processing and archiving data: Standards to be used for data and metadata format and content as well as software will be chosen at beginning of the project.
- Policies for access, sharing and re-use: Raw data will be classified in different degrees of confidentiality. As most of them will be highly sensitive, access and re-use (classification permitting) only by request. Derived data will be made available online.
12. Literature


